to occur as a result of the technical change. But how big these effects will be is largely a matter of guessing. It is also likely that the increased demand alone generated by the technical change will be insufficient to prevent downwards pressure on the real wage rate. If this should be the case, what then are the nmst attractive policy alternatives to generate demand for the labor released by the agricultural technical change.
In an attempt to answer these questions and to get some feel for the magnitudes of income generating and labor displacement (effects we constructed a relatively simple dynamic general equilibrium model with an agricultural and a nonagricultural sector along neoclass:L.cal lines.
The economy is closed, but it is not too difficult to evaluate how the opening of the economy would affect the conclusions. The model relates technical change in the two sectors --capital accumulation and labor and population growth --to per capita income, sectoral outputs, allocation of resources, and terms of trade. Instead of simulating with the model we use it to measure the impact of the exogenous variables on the endogenous ones at different stages of the development of Japan, i.e., we trace structural changes in that economy. In addition, the model allows us to measure the contributions of the exogenous variables to the growth of per capita income during each decade from 1880 to 1960.
1/ The focus of this paper is on technical change in the two sectors.-We take the view that technical change is sector specific, i.e., technical / Different aspects of this research are discussed in~~and~63. the augmentation parameters increase they raise efficiency in both sectors, although by amounts which differ slightly due to differences in production function parameters. Of course, their model was geared to evaluate possible biases in technical change where a factor augmenting framework is clearly appropriate. But the evaluation of the effect of technical change in one sector alone is precluded in their model. It seems to us that assuming nontransferability is a more realistic view of technical change.
Clearly, new seed varieties or pesticides do not raise nonagricultural productivity. Similarly, mechanical advances in the nonagricultural sector will pay off for the agricultural sector only if the agricultural machinery industry spends the research and development expenditures necessary to embody the advances in agriculture-specificmachinery. Of course, it may be true that some inventions raise productivity in both sectors, but they are probably the exceptions rather than the rule.
We also consider technical change as an investment activity similar to physical capital accumulation. These two investment activities compete for the aggregate saving of the economy (as does investment in human capital, which is not considered in the model). To prevent asymmetric treatment of the investment activities, savings and investment are not treated endogenously in the model. Rather capital accumulation rates and rates of technical change are treated exogenously. This iS appropriate because these variables can be viewed as policy targets and because we want to find out what the effect of changes in these rates are on per capita income and other endogenous variables.
The problem of not modeling them endogenously is that there is no way in our model to tell whether the economy allocated its overall investment resources efficiently to physical capital accumulation and to generating technical changes in the two sectors. We find, for example, that a one percent increase in nonagricultural technical change has a higher effect on per capita income growth than a similar increase in the rate of agricultural technical change. And both of these effects are larger than the effect on growth of a one percent increase in the capital accumulation rate. Does this mean that the economy should allocate more resources to nonagricultural technical change. This question cannot be answered without data on how much it costs to achieve a one percent increase in each of these rates of changes. If nonagricultural technical change is more expensive than agricultural technical change, it may still be better to concentrate on the latter. Our model, therefore, can only assess benefits of alternative courses of action. A full cost benefit analysis requires more information on relative costs.
Amodel similar to ours has been presented in Tolley and Smidt~2] who used it to assess the effect of technical change in agriculture on per capita income growth in the U. S. from 1930 to 1960. Our model departs from theirs in that it introduces population explicitly in the model and treats the labor participation rate as a variable. They also do not consider the role of nonagricultural technical change.
The model is discussed in detail elsewhere (Yamaguchi 1973 (Yamaguchi , 1974a Population and labor force are treated independently to permit separate evaluation of their effects on per capita income. This is a departure from usual growth models, which treat labor as a fixed fraction of the total population. Because population growth thus increases the labor force automatically such a treatment leads to an optimistic evaluation of population effects on per capita income. Only to the extent that diminishing returns to labor exist, will there be a detrimental impact on growth. If, however, an economy is experiencing unemployment problems, an increase in population may be accompanied by a decrease in the labor The proofs of equations (18) and (19) are complicated due to the labor market imperfections. The derivations of the other equations of the system are straightforward. For details see~~or~~.
After this transformation the model has the general form The rates of change of the exogenous variables are summarized in Table 3 . The rates of technical change were measured using equations (14) and (15) of Table l .g' This is the familiar Solow approach.?' Note in particular that the average rate of nonagricultural technical change exceeded the agricultural rate of technical change, but the former fluctuated much more than the latter. Population growth rates are low and larger after the turn of the century than before. The labor force grew at about the same average rate as did population, but these rates differed strongly in the short run.
/ For details of sources and transformations see~~.
/ We recognize the problems of measurement inherent in that approach.
The results of this paper are, of course, conditional on the judgment that despite all the problems of measurement and assumptions, growth accounting within a umdel can still give us further insight into the growth process. Table 5 , however, reveals that, overall, technical change has contributed more to the observed growth rates of per capita income than have growth of capital and labor. This is due to the fact that the rates of technical change exceeded the growth rates of capital and labor (see Table 3 ).
A disturbing conclusion from Figure 1 is the very low multiplier of capital. This is due to the low capital coefficients in the production functions, particularly in agriculture. It is so low because agricultural capital does not include land. But the multiplier remains low even if 
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In Table 5 Hence, output and consumption of the good increase.
More interesting, however, are the cross effects: agricultural technical change tends to increase nonagricultural output, despite the rise in the relative price of the nonagricultural good. The income effect outweighs the price effect, Conversely, nonagricultural technical change tends to decrease consumption of agricultural commodities, Hence, in the Japanese case, the income elasticity of agricultural goods was not sufficient to outweigh the relative price increase of the agricultural goods due to the nonagricultural technical change. Also, as the size of the agricultural sector declines, the absolute size of the cross effects decreases. Table 6 shows the resource allocation effects of sectoral technical thange. As above, technical change in nonagriculture pulls resources into that sector, despite the reduction in factor requirements to produce . .
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. . one unit of output. On the other hand, technical change in agriculture pushes resources out of that sector, which is an important observation for countries experiencing employment problems.
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Summary and Implications
The main conclusions can briefly be summarized as follows:
1) Technical change in Japan has contributed more to growth than the traditional factors, not because it is a more powerful engine of growth but because the rates of technical change exceeded the rates of accumulation of the traditional factors.
2) Nomgricultural technical change has contributed more to per capita income growth than agricultural technical change, primarily because the agricultural technical change multiplier has been smaller than the nonagricultural one except for the period 1880 to 1885 and because it has been steadily declining through time as the importance of that sector declined in the economy. This is at least consistent with the hypothesis that Japan did succeed in allocating investment resources in a growth maximizing way.
Japan also had a favorable population growth experience. At the early stages of development, when population growth was most detrimental, it had a smaller growth rate of population than at later stages. And, of course, the population growth rates were small throughout the period compared with growth rates in today's less developed countries. It was so small that it did not affect the labor participation rate in a negative way. Recognizing this problem implies that we cannot afford to neglect the nonagricultural sector. Unless this sector experiences growth and technical change labor has nowhere to go and will only depress wage rates.
What emerges is a difficult balancing act between the sectors which is the more difficult the higher the population growth rates and the earlier the development stage. There is a bonus to be gained from expanding the nonagricultural sector. With respect to pre-World War II, published sources are not available. However, the Japanese income elasticities were over the whole period. Therefore, price elasticities constant at -0.60 for the pre-World War 11 period.
almost constant were also held (7) and (9) Proportion of total labor and share of income produced in agriculture The total of agricultural labor is obtained from column (3) of Table 33 , p. 218, in LTES, Vol. 9. Total labor data comes from HSJE, p.
56. From these two data series the proportion of total labor in agriculture can be obtained. First, we can obtain the total national income from HSJE. We also obtain the value of agricultural output from LTES.
Therefore, we can obtain the share of income from them.
(8) Proportion of total.capital in agriculture
Since in these international comparisons only two inputs (capital (K) and labor (L)) in our agricultural production function were assumed, it is necessary to include the land value in Therefore, the arable land (column (14) Vol. 9) was multiplied by 0.0269 million yen the agricultural capital.
of prices. In addition, total capital is measured in gross terms instead of net terms, as used so far. However, the growth rates of gross and net capital stock do not differ very much.
Thus, the total gross capital in 1939 in Reference Table 3 in LTES,
Vol. 3 is compared with that of 1950, obtaining a value 1.2 times larger
